Identification in Auction Models with Interdependent Costs ∗-猫眼课题宝

具有相互依存成本的拍卖模型中的识别*

DOI：

发表时间：

2015

期刊：

影响因子：

通讯作者：

中科院分区：

文献类型：

作者：

G. Bulman

本文提供了一个积极的识别结果，采购模型与非对称投标人，统计依赖的私人信息，和相互依存的成本。当投标人是风险中性时，模型的收益相关基元是：（i）私人信息的联合分布和（ii）每个投标人的完全信息期望成本-期望成本条件下自己和竞争对手的信息。这些原语的非参数化确定的条件下观察到的成本转移的投标分布在以下四个假设。首先，每个投标人的私人信息可以由实值信号概括。第二，投标人信号的联合分布不依赖于成本转移者。第三，每个投标人的完全信息成本取决于自己的成本转移，而不是竞争对手的。第四，观察到的数据是由重复播放相同的均衡，投标人使用单调纯策略。我说明了如何识别参数是有用的估计使用的数据在密歇根州的高速公路上。这些估计被用来评估通过限制参与来降低赢家诅咒严重程度的政策。此版本：2015年4月1日。有关最新版本，请参阅economics.mit.edu/faculty/psomaini。我感谢Frank Wolak、Liran Einav、Han Hong、Peter Reiss、Timothy Bresnahan、Phil Haile、Steven Berry、Amit Gandhi、Tong Li、Matt Gentry、Lanier Benkard、Alejandro Molnar、Tim Armstrong、亚瑟货车Benthem、乔治Bulman、Dominic Coey、伊格纳西奥Esponda、Johannes Stroebel、Ali Yurukoglu和丹尼尔Waldinger，我还受益于斯坦福大学、伯克利分校、加州大学洛杉矶分校、西北大学、芝加哥大学的研讨会参与者，威斯康星州大学，纽约大学，哈佛，麻省理工学院，耶鲁大学，和范德比尔特。马丁·李约翰逊奖学金在此表示感谢。†麻省理工学院经济系，地址：77马萨诸塞州Ave E18-212，剑桥，MA 02139，psomaini@mit.edu

This paper provides a positive identification result for procurement models with asymmetric bidders, statistically dependent private information, and interdependent costs. When bidders are risk neutral, the model’s payoff-relevant primitives are: (i) the joint distribution of private information and (ii) each bidder’s fullinformation expected cost—the expected cost conditional on own and competitors’ information. These primitives are nonparametrically identified from the distribution of bids conditional on observable cost shifters under the following four assumptions. First, each bidder’s private information can be summarized by a real-valued signal. Second, the joint distribution of bidders’ signals does not depend on cost shifters. Third, each bidder’s full-information cost depends on own cost shifters but not on competitors’. Fourth, the observed data are generated by the repeated play of the same equilibrium where bidders use monotone pure strategies. I illustrate how the identification argument is useful for estimation using data from Highway Procurements in Michigan. The estimates are used to evaluate policies that reduce the severity of the winner’s curse by restricting participation. ∗This version: April 1, 2015. For the latest version, see economics.mit.edu/faculty/psomaini. I am grateful to Frank Wolak, Liran Einav, Han Hong, Peter Reiss, Timothy Bresnahan, Phil Haile, Steven Berry, Amit Gandhi, Tong Li, Matt Gentry, Lanier Benkard, Alejandro Molnar, Tim Armstrong, Arthur van Benthem, George Bulman, Dominic Coey, Ignacio Esponda, Johannes Stroebel, Ali Yurukoglu, and Daniel Waldinger, I have also benefited from seminar participants at Stanford, Berkeley, UCLA, Northwestern, Chicago U, Wisconsin U, NYU, Harvard, MIT, Yale, and Vanderbilt. The Martin Lee Johnson fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. †Department of Economics, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Ave E18-212, Cambridge, MA 02139, psomaini@mit.edu

Identification in Auction Models with Interdependent Costs ∗

具有相互依存成本的拍卖模型中的识别*

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献