Obfuscation, Learning, and the Evolution of Investor Sophistication
Obfuscation, Learning, and the Evolution of Investor Sophistication
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1338187
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发表时间：
2009-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Carlin;Gustavo Manso
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Carlin;Gustavo Manso
投资者的老练程度落后于零售金融市场日益复杂的程度。为了探索这一点，我们开发了一个动态模型来研究混淆和投资者成熟度之间的相互作用。考虑到投资者群体中不同的学习机制，我们描述了提供零售产品的金融机构的最佳混淆时机。混淆随着公司之间的竞争而减少，但随着投资者参与市场的程度增加而增加。我们表明，教育的举措，旨在促进投资者的学习可能会导致生产者增加浪费混淆，进一步迷惑投资者，降低整体福利。
Investor sophistication has lagged behind the growing complexity of retail financial markets. To explore this, we develop a dynamic model to study the interaction between obfuscation and investor sophistication. Taking into account different learning mechanisms within the investor population, we characterize the optimal timing of obfuscation for financial institutions who offer retail products. Obfuscation decreases with competition among firms, but increases with higher investor participation in the market. We show that educational initiatives that are directed to facilitate learning by investors may induce producers to increase wasteful obfuscation, further disorienting investors and decreasing overall welfare.