Welfare Effects of Patent Protection in a Semi-Endogenous Growth Model
Welfare Effects of Patent Protection in a Semi-Endogenous Growth Model
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半内生增长模型中专利保护的福利效应
DOI：
10.1017/s1365100518000147
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Iwaisako Tatsuro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Inoue Akira;Miyagishima Kaname;Kaname Miyagishima;宮城島要;宮城島要;宮城島要;Iwaisako Tatsuro
本文在一个无标度的质量阶梯模型中考察了加强专利保护如何影响福利，该模型由Segerstrom [American Economic Review 88，1290-1310]发展，并由Li [American Economic Review 93，1009-1017]推广。在Segerstrom-Li模型中，专利保护不会对生产部门之间的静态分配造成扭曲。为了充分考察加强专利保护的福利效应，我们在Segerstrom-Li模型中引入了竞争性外部商品。在一般模型中，我们利用转移路径的线性近似，解析地推导出专利保护的福利最大化程度，结果表明，当外部产品的市场份额为正时，专利保护的福利最大化程度比外部产品的市场份额为零时弱。换句话说，忽视专利保护造成的静态扭曲会导致过度的专利保护。
This paper examines how strengthening patent protection affects welfare in a nonscale quality-ladder model, which was developed by Segerstrom [American Economic Review 88, 1290–1310] and generalized by Li [American Economic Review 93, 1009–1017]. In the Segerstrom–Li model, patent protection creates no distortion in static allocation among the production sectors. In order to examine the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection adequately, we incorporate a competitive outside good into the Segerstrom–Li model. In the general model, we derive the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection analytically by utilizing a linear approximation of the transition path. The result shows that the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection is weaker when the market share of the outside good is positive than when it is zero. In other words, disregarding the static distortion that patent protection creates leads to excessive patent protection.