Reference dependence, cooperation, and coordination in games
Reference dependence, cooperation, and coordination in games
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博弈中的参考依赖、合作和协调
DOI：
10.1017/s1930297500003909
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Jonathan W. Leland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mark Schneider;Jonathan W. Leland
自私自利的参与者如何在有背叛动机的情况下进行合作，以及参与者如何在存在多重均衡的情况下进行协调，这些问题都是博弈论中最古老、最基本的问题。在本报告中，我们证明了博弈中参考结果的合理甚至自然规范同时预测了囚徒困境中的系统合作和背叛，以及协调博弈中的均衡选择和非均衡行为。即使玩家是纯粹自利的，没有明显的标签，游戏只玩一次，没有任何形式的交流，这些预测也是成立的。此外，与无限重复的囚徒困境和协调博弈中的多重均衡相反，预测是唯一的。我们用实验结果来检验模型的预测。
The problems of how self-interested players can cooperate despite incentives to defect, and how players can coordinate despite the presence of multiple equilibria, are among the oldest and most fundamental in game theory. In this report, we demonstrate that a plausible and even natural specification of the reference outcome in a game simultaneously predicts systematic cooperation and defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as well as equilibrium selection and out-of-equilibrium play in coordination games. The predictions hold even if players are purely self-interested, there are no salient labels, the game is played only once, and there is no communication of any kind. Furthermore, the predictions are unique, as opposed to the multiplicity of equilibria in the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and in coordination games. We apply experimental results to test the predictions of the model.