Incentives and political economy
Incentives and political economy
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激励和政治经济学
DOI：
10.1093/0199248680.001.0001
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Laffont
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Laffont
主流经济学直到最近才认识到，有必要将政治约束纳入政策顾问的经济分析中。激励和政治经济学使用契约理论的最新进展，建立一个规范的方法，在经济环境中的宪法设计。本书的第一部分仍然保持着仁慈的宪法设计的传统，完全承包。它将政治家视为知情的监督者，并研究宪法应如何控制他们，特别是避免被利益集团俘虏。权力分立或制衡制度的激励理论得到发展。书的第二部分承认宪法契约的不完整性，它把自由裁量权留给了选举过程中选出的政治家。不对称信息将信息租金与经济政策联系在一起，政治游戏变成了对这些租金进行代价高昂的再分配的游戏。拉丰教授调查之间的权衡不灵活的宪法，政治家留下很少的自由裁量权，但牺牲事后效率和宪法的权重对事后效率，但也给予相当大的自由裁量权，政治家追求私人议程。本书的最后一部分重新考虑了在信息不对称的情况下合谋的建模。它提出了一种新的方法来表征激励约束的群体行为时，不对称信息是不可验证的。这提供了一种方法论，以确定最佳的宪法反应的利益集团的活动，并研究任何制度的设计，其中群体行为是重要的。OSO提供：http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0199248680/toc.html
Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments. The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed. The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitution weighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas. The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/0199248680/toc.html