Emotion and deliberative reasoning in moral judgment.
Emotion and deliberative reasoning in moral judgment.
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DOI：
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00328
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Cummins RC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cummins DD;Cummins RC
根据一个有影响力的双过程模型，道德判断是一个快速的、充满情感的过程和一个较慢的、深思熟虑的过程的结果。如果这些输出发生冲突，则增加决策时间以解决冲突。违反禁止使用个人武力进行故意伤害的道义原则被推定会引起负面影响，从而在决策过程早期就使判决产生偏见。这一模型在三个实验中进行了测试。道德困境使用(A)决定、时间和共识作为系统冲突的衡量标准和(B)上述道义标准进行分类。在实验1中，决定时间不受限制或减少。两难境地是，采取道德上有问题的行动以产生“更好的”结果是否合适。限制决策时间减少了功利性(“是”)决策的比例，但与模型的预测相反，(A)涉及更多道义违规的小插曲记录了更快的决策时间，以及(B)违反道义原则不能预测决策冲突概况。实验二排除了时间压力只会让人更喜欢说“不”的可能性。参与者在有时间限制的情况下做出了第一个决定，在没有时间限制的情况下做出了第二个决定。其中一组被问到采取道德上有问题的行动是否合适，而另一组被问到拒绝采取行动是否合适。无论“是”或“否”是否构成功利性决定，实验1的结果都是相同的。在实验3中，参与者在做出决定之前对正面视觉刺激的愉悦感进行了评分。与模型的预测相反，与参与认知任务的小组或既不参与认知任务的控制组相比，积极情感评级组的道义决定数量增加。这些结果与早期道德判断受情感影响的观点是一致的。但他们与以下观点不一致：(A)违反道义学原则预示着早期基于情感的判断的差异，或(B)从事与此类违规行为引起的负面情绪反应不一致的任务会减少其影响。
According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid, affect-laden process and a slower, deliberative process. If these outputs conflict, decision time is increased in order to resolve the conflict. Violations of deontological principles proscribing the use of personal force to inflict intentional harm are presumed to elicit negative affect which biases judgments early in the decision-making process. This model was tested in three experiments. Moral dilemmas were classified using (a) decision time and consensus as measures of system conflict and (b) the aforementioned deontological criteria. In Experiment 1, decision time was either unlimited or reduced. The dilemmas asked whether it was appropriate to take a morally questionable action to produce a “greater good” outcome. Limiting decision time reduced the proportion of utilitarian (“yes”) decisions, but contrary to the model’s predictions, (a) vignettes that involved more deontological violations logged faster decision times, and (b) violation of deontological principles was not predictive of decisional conflict profiles. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that time pressure simply makes people more like to say “no.” Participants made a first decision under time constraints and a second decision under no time constraints. One group was asked whether it was appropriate to take the morally questionable action while a second group was asked whether it was appropriate to refuse to take the action. The results replicated that of Experiment 1 regardless of whether “yes” or “no” constituted a utilitarian decision. In Experiment 3, participants rated the pleasantness of positive visual stimuli prior to making a decision. Contrary to the model’s predictions, the number of deontological decisions increased in the positive affect rating group compared to a group that engaged in a cognitive task or a control group that engaged in neither task. These results are consistent with the view that early moral judgments are influenced by affect. But they are inconsistent with the view that (a) violation of deontological principles are predictive of differences in early, affect-based judgment or that (b) engaging in tasks that are inconsistent with the negative emotional responses elicited by such violations diminishes their impact.
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