The analytic‐continental divide in philosophical practice: An empirical study
The analytic‐continental divide in philosophical practice: An empirical study
复制标题
哲学实践中的分析与大陆分歧：一项实证研究
DOI：
10.1111/meta.12519
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
M. Dickinson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Moti Mizrahi;M. Dickinson
哲学通常分为两种传统：分析哲学和大陆哲学。然而，描述分析-大陆的划分并非易事。一些哲学家根据这些传统中争论的位置来解释这种分歧。这就提出了以下问题：分析哲学是否充斥着论证而欧陆哲学却没有论证？或者在分析哲学和大陆哲学中可以找到不同类型的论证吗？本文介绍了从JSTOR数据库（n = 53,260）中挖掘的大型哲学文本语料库的实证研究结果，该语料库旨在按类型找到论证模式。总体而言，结果表明，在分析哲学和大陆哲学期刊文章中提出的论证类型之间没有显著差异。因此，这些发现没有为分析哲学和大陆哲学之间的分歧与这些传统中争论的位置有关的假设提供经验支持。
Philosophy is often divided into two traditions: analytic and continental philosophy. Characterizing the analytic‐continental divide, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers explain the divide in terms of the place of argument in these traditions. This raises the following questions: Is analytic philosophy rife with arguments while continental philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in analytic and continental philosophy? This paper presents the results of an empirical study of a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) designed to find patterns of argumentation by type. Overall, the results suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in analytic and continental philosophy journal articles. The findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy has to do with the place of argument in these traditions.