A bargaining game model for efficiency decomposition in the centralized model of two-stage systems
A bargaining game model for efficiency decomposition in the centralized model of two-stage systems
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cie.2012.09.014
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zhongbao Zhou;Liang Sun;Wenyu Yang;Wenbin Liu;Chaoqun Ma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhongbao Zhou;Liang Sun;Wenyu Yang;Wenbin Liu;Chaoqun Ma
数据包络分析（DEA）是一种非参数的方法来衡量同行决策单元（DMU）的相对效率。集中式模型已被广泛用于检验两阶段系统的效率，其中第一阶段的所有输出是第二阶段的唯一输入。由于存在多个最优权重时，两个阶段的总体效率分解可能存在一定的灵活性，因此我们建立了一个纳什讨价还价博弈模型，在保持总体效率不变的情况下，对两个阶段进行公平的效率分解。以两个阶段的最小可达效率为分解点，得到了总效率的唯一讨价还价分解。运用纳什讨价还价博弈模型对中国建设银行10家分行的绩效进行了评价。
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric approach for measuring the relative efficiencies of peer decision making units (DMUs). The centralized model has been widely used to examine the efficiencies of two-stage systems, where all the outputs from the first stage are the only inputs to the second stage. Since there may exist some flexibility in decomposing the overall efficiency between the two stages when multiple optimal weights exist, we develop a Nash bargaining game model to obtain a fair efficiency decomposition for the two stages while keeping the overall efficiency unchanged under this circumstance. The minimal achievable efficiencies for the two stages are used as the breakdown point and the unique bargaining decomposition of the overall efficiency is obtained subsequently. The Nash bargaining game model is applied to evaluate the performance of 10 branches of China Construction Bank.