Notes on Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs
Notes on Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs
复制标题
关于细化和高阶信念的注释
DOI:
10.1007/s42973-019-00007-w
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Stephen Morris
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Atsushi Kajii;Stephen Morris
This paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a “canonical” way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple “complete theory” interpretation (Kreps 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the “higher order beliefs literature”(Rubinstein 1989; Monderer and Samet 1989; Rob et al. 1995; Kajii and Morris 1997) and the “payoff uncertainty approach”(Fudenberg et al. 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg 1990).In particular, this paper provided a unified framework to relate the notion of equilibria robust to incomplete information introduced in Kajii and Morris (1997)[Hereafter, KM1997] to the classic refinements literature. It followed Fudenberg et al.(1988) and Kreps (1990) in relating refinements of Nash equilibria to a “complete theory” where behavior was rationalized by explicit incomplete information about payoffs, rather than depending on action trembles or other exogenous perturbations. It followed Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chapter 14, in providing a unified treatment of refinements and a literature on higher-order beliefs rather than proposing a particular solution concept.