Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms
Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms
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DOI：
10.1086/657622
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发表时间：
2011-01-01
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Yu, Douglas W.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Archetti, Marco;Ubeda, Francisco;Yu, Douglas W.
阻碍合作进化的主要问题之一是合作伙伴的选择。当信息不对称时（潜在伴侣的品质只有他自己知道），似乎没有信号就不可能选择伴侣。然而，许多互惠关系是在没有信号的情况下存在的，宿主选择合适伙伴的机制尚不清楚。在这里，我们提出了一个一般的合作伙伴选择机制，“筛选”，这类似于机制设计的经济学理论。施加适当的成本和奖励可能会促使知情的个体根据自己的类型筛选自己，从而使不知情的个体在没有信号的情况下与正确的伙伴建立联系。几种类型的生物共生是很好的筛选候选者，包括短尾鱿鱼、抗植物、肠道微生物群和许多产生活性氧的动植物物种。我们描述了一系列用于筛选的诊断测试。筛选博弈可以适用于副产品、合作伙伴忠诚反馈或宿主制裁不适用的情况，因此可以解释在潜在共生体不可能事先发出合作信号且宿主不惩罚共生体不当行为的系统中互惠主义的演变。
One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however, exist without signaling, and the mechanisms by which hosts might select the right partners are unclear. Here we propose a general mechanism of partner choice, "screening," that is similar to the economic theory of mechanism design. Imposing the appropriate costs and rewards may induce the informed individuals to screen themselves according to their types and therefore allow a noninformed individual to establish associations with the correct partners in the absence of signaling. Several types of biological symbioses are good candidates for screening, including bobtail squid, ant-plants, gut microbiomes, and many animal and plant species that produce reactive oxygen species. We describe a series of diagnostic tests for screening. Screening games can apply to the cases where by-products, partner fidelity feedback, or host sanctions do not apply, therefore explaining the evolution of mutualism in systems where it is impossible for potential symbionts to signal their cooperativeness beforehand and where the host does not punish symbiont misbehavior.