Mechanisms and natural kinds
Mechanisms and natural kinds
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DOI：
10.1080/09515080903238930
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发表时间：
2009-01-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Craver, Carl F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Craver, Carl F.
人们通常将稳态属性集群（HPC）观点视为关于自然种类的约定主义和本质主义之间的第三种方式（Boyd，1989，1991，1997，1999；Griffiths，1997，1999；Keil，2003；Kornblith，1993；Wilson，1999，2005；Wilson，Barker，＆布里甘特，即将出版）。根据 HPC 的观点，房地产集群不仅仅是传统意义上的聚集在一起，而是聚集在一起。簇中属性的共现是通过相似性生成（或稳态）机制来维持的。我认为，传统元素部分但不可避免地参与决定哪些机制定义类型、决定两个机制何时是同一类型的机制以及决定一个特定机制在哪里结束而另一个在哪里开始。这种传统观点对机制概念的侵入引起了人们的怀疑，即 HPC 观点是否充分摆脱了传统因素，可以在关于特殊科学应该是什么的科学争论中充当客观仲裁者。
It is common to defend the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) view as a third way between conventionalism and essentialism about natural kinds (Boyd, 1989, 1991, 1997, 1999; Griffiths, 1997, 1999; Keil, 2003; Kornblith, 1993; Wilson, 1999, 2005; Wilson, Barker, & Brigandt, forthcoming). According to the HPC view, property clusters are not merely conventionally clustered together; the co-occurrence of properties in the cluster is sustained by a similarity generating (or homeostatic) mechanism. I argue that conventional elements are involved partly but ineliminably in deciding which mechanisms define kinds, for deciding when two mechanisms are mechanisms of the same type, and for deciding where one particular mechanism ends and another begins. This intrusion of conventional perspective into the idea of a mechanism raises doubts as to whether the HPC view is sufficiently free of conventional elements to serve as an objective arbiter in scientific disputes about what the kinds of the special sciences should be.