Preventing Occupancy Detection From Smart Meters
Preventing Occupancy Detection From Smart Meters
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DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2015.2402224
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发表时间：
2015-09-01
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
Albrecht, Jeannie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chen, Dong;Kalra, Sandeep;Albrecht, Jeannie
公用事业正在迅速部署实时测量用电量的智能电表。不幸的是，智能电表间接泄漏了有关家庭占用的敏感信息，这很容易检测，因为它与简单的统计指标高度相关，例如功率的均值，方差和范围。为了防止占用检测，我们建议使用已经存在于许多家庭中的电热水器的热能存储。从本质上讲，我们的方法，我们称之为组合加热和隐私（CHPr），调节热水器的电力使用，使其看起来像有人总是在家。我们设计了一个CHPr启用热水器，调节其能源使用，以挫败各种占用检测攻击，而不违反其目标-按需提供热水-并评估它在模拟使用真实的数据。我们的研究结果表明，一个标准的50加仑的CHPr热水器可以防止各种最先进的占用检测攻击。
Utilities are rapidly deploying smart meters that measure electricity usage in real-time. Unfortunately, smart meters indirectly leak sensitive information about a home's occupancy, which is easy to detect because it highly correlates with simple statistical metrics, such as power's mean, variance, and range. To prevent occupancy detection, we propose using the thermal energy storage of electric water heaters already present in many homes. In essence, our approach, which we call combined heat and privacy (CHPr), modulates a water heater's power usage to make it look like someone is always home. We design a CHPr-enabled water heater that regulates its energy usage to thwart a variety of occupancy detection attacks without violating its objective-to provide hot water on demand-and evaluate it in simulation using real data. Our results show that a standard 50-gal CHPr-enabled water heater prevents a wide range of state-of-the-art occupancy detection attacks.