Sustainable Plans
Sustainable Plans
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可持续计划
DOI:
10.1086/261706
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发表时间:
1990
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
P. Kehoe
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
V. Chari;P. Kehoe
We propose a definition of time-consistent policy for infinite-horizon economies with competitive private agents. Allocations and policies are defined as functions of the history of past policies. A sustainable equilibrium is a sequence of history-contingent policies and allocations that satisfy certain sequential optimality conditions for the government and for private agents. We provide a complete characterization of the sustainable equilibrium outcomes for a variant of Fischer's model of capital taxation. We also relate our work to recent developments in the theory of repeated games.
影响因子:
6.1
作者:
ABREU, D
通讯作者:
ABREU, D