Pay‐Performance Sensitivity in a Heterogeneous Managerial Labor Market
Pay‐Performance Sensitivity in a Heterogeneous Managerial Labor Market
复制标题
异质管理劳动力市场中的薪酬绩效敏感性
DOI：
10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.19
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Fei Leng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Chen;Fei Leng
高管薪酬与企业绩效之间持续较低的薪酬-绩效敏感度一直困扰着从业者和学者。我们提出了一个混合模型，将道德风险和逆向选择问题来解释这个难题。我们认为，管理劳动力市场是异质性的性质，而不是同质的假设，由纯道德风险模型和实证工作的基础上，这个模型。我们证明了混合模型的最优薪酬-绩效敏感性低于纯道德风险模型。此外，我们还表明，薪酬-绩效敏感性是市场类型组合的函数。市场上有能力的经理人越多，市场的平均薪酬-业绩敏感度就越高。然后，我们进行实证检验，并找到与我们的模型预测一致的证据。
The persistently low pay‐performance sensitivity between executive compensation and firm performance has puzzled both practitioners and academics. We propose a hybrid model that incorporates both moral hazard and adverse selection problems to explain this puzzle. We argue that the managerial labor market is heterogeneous in nature, not homogeneous as assumed by the pure moral hazard model and empirical work based on this model. We demonstrate that the optimal pay‐performance sensitivity derived from the hybrid model is lower than that derived from the pure moral hazard model. Furthermore, we also show that pay‐performance sensitivity is a function of the mix of types in the market. The more capable managers there are in the market, the more likely the market's average pay‐performance sensitivity is high. We then conduct an empirical test and find evidence that is consistent with the prediction of our model.