SGAM: strategy‐proof group buying‐based auction mechanism for virtual machine allocation in clouds
SGAM: strategy‐proof group buying‐based auction mechanism for virtual machine allocation in clouds
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DOI：
10.1002/cpe.3605
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发表时间：
2015-12
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yonglong Zhang;Bin Li;Zhiqiu Huang;Jin Wang;Junwu Zhu
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文献类型：
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作者：
Yonglong Zhang;Bin Li;Zhiqiu Huang;Jin Wang;Junwu Zhu
研究了云资源拍卖问题，其中用户可以竞标包含异构类型虚拟机的资源包，供应商通过组价格模型将虚拟机分配给用户。与固定价格模型相比，由于其经济效率低和不灵活的性质，固定价格模型并不总是交易资源的最佳方法，团体价格模型具有更好的灵活性和对拍卖参与者的货币利益（例如，云服务提供商和用户）。提出的拍卖机制基于防策略团购的拍卖机制，将云中虚拟机分配问题表述为组合拍卖问题，并具有个体理性、事后预算平衡和真实性等重要性质，同时保证了供应商收益和系统效率的有效性。大量的仿真结果表明，该机制产生的分配效率和计算的易处理性相比，固定价格模型的机制。版权所有© 2015约翰威利父子有限公司.
We study the cloud resource auction problem where users can bid for resource bundle containing heterogeneous types of virtual machines, and providers allocate virtual machines to their users through group price model. Compared with fixed price model, which is not always the best approach for trading resources as its economically inefficient and inflexible nature, the group price model possess the better flexibility and monetary benefits for auction participants (e.g., cloud providers and users). The proposed auction mechanism strategy‐proof group buying‐based auction mechanism, which formulates the problem of virtual machine allocation in clouds as a combinatorial auction problem, and holds some important property such as individual rationality, ex‐post budget balance, and truthfulness, meanwhile guaranteeing efficiency in both the provider's revenue and system efficiency. Extensive simulation results show that the proposed mechanism yields the allocation efficiency and computational tractability compared with the mechanism with fixed price model. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.