Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements and International Trade
Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements and International Trade
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自我执行的环境协议和国际贸易
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.03.006
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Pethig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Eichner;R. Pethig
在国际环境协定（IEA）文献的基本模型中（Barrett，1994；Rubio 和 Ulph，2006），如果排除非正排放，自我执行的 IEA 签署国数量不超过 3 个。我们通过引入在每个国家生产和消费并在世界市场上交易的复合消费品和化石燃料来扩展该模型。当签署国充当斯塔克尔伯格领导者并且排放量为正值时，在我们的国际贸易模型中，稳定的国际能源机构的规模可能会大得多。如果更大规模的自我执行国际能源署能够带来更大幅度的总排放量削减，这将是个好消息。不幸的是，在存在自我执行的国际能源署的情况下，总排放量仅略低于正常情况下的排放量，与签署国的数量无关。我们还通过比较我们的自由贸易结果与自给自足政权的结果来研究国际贸易的作用。事实证明，我们的自给自足模式与上面提到的文献的基本模式是一致的。我们为该文献做出了贡献，表明在自给自足的情况下，自我执行的国际能源署的结果也几乎与一切照旧的情况相同。
In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett, 1994; Rubio and Ulph, 2006), the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and fossil fuel that are produced and consumed in each country and traded on world markets. When signatory countries act as a Stackelberg leader and emissions are positive, the size of stable IEAs may be significantly larger in our model with international trade. This would be good news if larger self-enforcing IEAs would lead to stronger reductions of total emissions. Unfortunately, in the presence of self-enforcing IEAs total emissions turn out to be only slightly less than in the business as usual scenario, independent of the number of signatories. We also investigate the role of international trade by comparing our free-trade results with the outcome in the regime of autarky. Our autarky model turns out to be coincident with the basic model of the literature alluded to above. We contribute to that literature by showing that in autarky the outcome of self-enforcing IEAs is also almost the same as in the business as usual scenario.