Profit Sharing as a Management Strategy for a State-owned Teak Plantation at High Risk for Illegal Logging
Profit Sharing as a Management Strategy for a State-owned Teak Plantation at High Risk for Illegal Logging
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.005
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发表时间：
2018-07-01
影响因子：
7
通讯作者：
Iwasa, Yoh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lee, Joung Hun;Kubo, Yuki;Iwasa, Yoh
非法采伐对热带地区的种植园是一个严重的威胁。本文通过一个动态博弈模型研究了利润分享在种植园经营策略中的作用。该模型假设所有者选择要收获的树木的年龄，当地人选择他们的监测工作水平，以防止非法采伐。树木被移走后，业主雇用当地人重新种植树苗。本文导出了确定树龄为t的立地价值的递推公式，并用迭代法求解。在非法采伐的压力下，所有者可能会发现与当地人分享采伐利润以加强他们的监督工作是有利可图的。较高的自然干扰率缩短了平均树龄，导致所有者通过提高利润分享率来投资更多以抑制非法采伐。未来贴现率较低会导致较老的树木被砍伐，并降低利润分享率。如果增加补种成本，当地群众不愿意参与监督活动，业主提高利润分成比例，鼓励他们参与。我们讨论这些结果的政策含义。
Illegal logging is a serious threat to plantations in the tropics. Here, we study the roles of profit-sharing in plantation management strategy in a dynamic game model. The model assumes that the owner chooses the age of the trees to be harvested and the local people choose their level of monitoring effort to prevent illegal logging with surveillance. After the trees are removed, the owner hires local people to replant young trees. We derived recursive formulas for determining the value of a site with trees of age t, and solved them by iteration. Under the pressure of illegal logging, the owner may find it profitable to share harvesting profits with the local people to enhance their surveillance effort. A higher rate of natural disturbance shortens the mean tree age, leading the owner to invest more to suppress illegal logging by increasing the profit-sharing rate. A lower future discount rate leads to older trees being harvested and decreases the profit-sharing rate. If the cost of replanting is increased, the local people are reluctant to participate in surveillance activities, and the owner increases the profit-sharing rate to encourage their participation. We discuss the policy implications of these results.