Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat
Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat
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高阶证据和失败的极限
DOI：
10.1111/phpr.12090
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Maria Lasonen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Maria Lasonen
最近的作者已经注意到一种通常被称为高阶证据的失败证据。这些证据的作用是让人怀疑一个人的虔诚状态是一个有缺陷的过程的结果--例如，一个扭曲理性的药物所带来的过程。我认为，容纳失败的高阶证据需要一个双层理论的理由，这一现象引起了一个谜。令人困惑的是，至少在某些涉及高阶失败者的情况下，正确的认知规则会发出相互矛盾的建议。例如，一个主体应该相信p，但她也应该暂停对p的判断。第一种理论认为只有一个正确的认识规则，即欧贝尔规则。第二种观点认为存在真正的认识困境。第三种诉诸于正确认识规则的等级或排序。我为所有这些反应指出了问题。我的结论是，从这个难题中得出的正确教训是，一个国家可以在认识上是理性的或合理的，即使人们有看起来很强的证据认为它不是。因此，提出的考虑构成了一种外在主义的非问题论证。
Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process —for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting recommendations. For instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend judgment in p. I discuss three responses. The first resists the puzzle by arguing that there is only one correct epistemic rule, an € Uber-rule. The second accepts that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas. The third appeals to a hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out problems for all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw from the puzzle is that a state can be epistemically rational or justified even if one has what looks to be strong evidence to think that it is not. As such, the considerations put forth constitute a non-question-begging argument for a kind of externalism.