Contingent technocracy: bureaucratic independence in developing countries
Contingent technocracy: bureaucratic independence in developing countries
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临时技术官僚：发展中国家的官僚独立
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Anne Pitcher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Manuel P. Teodoro;M. Anne Pitcher
本研究探讨在不同民主条件下正式官僚独立的影响。传统观点预测，技术官僚机构更大的正式独立性有助于政策的实施，但这些说法是基于对工业化、高收入国家的观察，这些国家也是成熟的民主国家。在发展中国家的研究的基础上，我们认为，机构独立性的影响取决于政治环境中的机构运作。我们的实证主题是私有化机构和他们的努力私有化国有企业在非洲。我们预测，在专制政权下，更大的独立性会导致更彻底的私有化，但随着国家变得更加民主，独立的影响会下降。使用原始数据集，我们研究了1990年至2007年非洲正式机构独立性和私有化之间的关系。我们的研究结果修改了传统的智慧官僚独立性和最终在一个更微妙的理论“权变技术官僚”。
This study investigates the effects of formal bureaucratic independence under varying democratic conditions. Conventional accounts predict that greater formal independence of technocratic agencies facilitates policy implementation, but those claims rest on observations of industrialised, high-income countries that are also established democracies. On the basis of research in developing countries, we argue that the effects of agency independence depend on the political context in which the agency operates. Our empirical subjects are privatisation agencies and their efforts to privatise state-owned enterprises in Africa. We predict that greater independence leads to more thorough privatisation under authoritarian regimes, but that the effect of independence declines as a country becomes more democratic. Using an original data set, we examine the relationship between formal agency independence and privatisation in Africa from 1990 to 2007. Our results modify the conventional wisdom on bureaucratic independence and culminate in a more nuanced theory of “contingent technocracy”.