Regulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft set their own rules?

Regulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft set their own rules?
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DOI:
10.1016/j.trb.2019.09.008
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发表时间:
2019-11-01
影响因子:
6.8
通讯作者:
Varaiya, Pravin
Varaiya, Pravin
中科院分区:
工程技术1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Li, Sen;Tavafoghi, Hamidreza;Varaiya, Pravin

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我们评估了 Uber、Lyft 和滴滴等交通网络公司 (TNC) 的三项拟议法规的影响:(1) 司机最低工资,(2) 司机或车辆数量上限,以及 (3) 每次行程拥堵税。使用排队理论均衡模型评估影响,该模型结合了基于应用程序的乘车匹配平台的随机动态、平台制定的乘车价格和司机工资以及乘客和司机的激励。我们发现,司机收入下限可以推动网约车平台雇用更多司机并提供更多乘车服务,同时乘客可以享受更快的乘车速度和更低的总成本,同时平台租金也会降低。与标准竞争性劳动力市场理论相反,对司机实施最低工资有利于司机和乘客,并提高整个系统的效率。这一令人惊讶的结果几乎适用于所有模型参数,其发生是因为工资下限限制了跨国公司劳动力市场的力量。与工资下限相比,对车辆数量施加上限会伤害司机,因为该平台获得了限制供应的所有好处。拥堵税带来了预期的影响:票价上涨、工资和平台收入减少。我们还构建了该模型的变体来简要讨论平台补贴、平台竞争和自动驾驶汽车。 (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. 保留所有权利。
We evaluate the impact of three proposed regulations of transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber, Lyft and Didi: (1) A minimum wage for drivers, (2) a cap on the number of drivers or vehicles, and (3) a per-trip congestion tax. The impact is assessed using a queuing theoretic equilibrium model which incorporates the stochastic dynamics of the app-based ride-hailing matching platform, the ride prices and driver wages established by the platform, and the incentives of passengers and drivers. We show that a floor placed under driver earnings can push the ride-hailing platform to hire more drivers and offer more rides, at the same time that passengers enjoy faster rides and lower total cost, while platform rents are reduced. Contrary to standard competitive labor market theory, enforcing a minimum wage for drivers benefits both drivers and passengers, and promotes the efficiency of the entire system. This surprising outcome holds for almost all model parameters, and it occurs because the wage floor curbs TNC labor market power. In contrast to a wage floor, imposing a cap on the number of vehicles hurts drivers, because the platform reaps all the benefits of limiting supply. The congestion tax has the expected impact: fares increase, wages and platform revenue decrease. We also construct variants of the model to briefly discuss platform subsidy, platform competition, and autonomous vehicles. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.