Polynomial Time Algorithms to Find an Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Chores
Polynomial Time Algorithms to Find an Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Chores
复制标题
用于寻找家务近似竞争平衡的多项式时间算法
DOI:
10.1137/1.9781611977073.92
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Mehta, Ruta
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Boodaghians, Shant;Chaudhury, Bhaskar Ray;Mehta, Ruta
Competitive equilibrium with equal income (CEEI) is considered one of the best mechanisms to allocate a set of items among agents fairly and efficiently. In this paper, we study the computation of CEEI when items are chores that are disliked (negatively valued) by agents, under 1-homogeneous and concave utility functions which includes linear functions as a subcase. It is well-known that, even with linear utilities, the set of CEEI may be non-convex and disconnected, and the problem is PPAD-hard in the more general exchange model. In contrast to these negative results, we design a FPTAS: A polynomial-time algorithm to compute∊-approximate CEEI where the running-time depends polynomially on .Our algorithm relies on the recent characterization due to Bogomolnaia et al. (2017) of the CEEI set as exactly the KKT points of a non-convex minimization problem that have all coordinates non-zero. Due to thisnon-zeroconstraint, naïve gradient-based methods fail to find the desired local minima as they are attracted towards zero. We develop anexterior-point methodthat alternates between guessingnon-zeroKKT points and maximizing the objective along supporting hyperplanes at these points. We show that this procedure must converge quickly to an approximate KKT point which then can be mapped to an approximate CEEI; this exterior point method may be of independent interest.When utility functions are linear, we give explicit procedures for finding the exact iterates, and as a result show that a stronger form of approximate CEEI can be found in polynomial time. Finally, we note that our algorithm extends to the setting of un-equal incomes (CE), and to mixed manna with linear utilities where each agent may like (positively value) some items and dislike (negatively value) others.
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2914241
发表时间:
2017-02
期刊:
National Research University Higher School of Economics Research Paper Series
影响因子:
--
作者:
Anna Bogomolnaia;H. Moulin;Fedor Sandomirskiy;E. Yanovskaya
通讯作者:
Anna Bogomolnaia;H. Moulin;Fedor Sandomirskiy;E. Yanovskaya
DOI:
10.1287/moor.2023.1361
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
ArXiv
影响因子:
--
作者:
Simina Brânzei;Fedor Sandomirskiy
通讯作者:
Fedor Sandomirskiy
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
Symposium on the Theory of Computing
影响因子:
--
作者:
László A. Végh
通讯作者:
László A. Végh
DOI:
10.1137/1.9781611976465.85
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA
影响因子:
--
作者:
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg
通讯作者:
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg
DOI:
10.1145/2488608.2488617
发表时间:
2013
期刊:
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子:
--
作者:
M. Feldman;N. Gravin;Brendan Lucier
通讯作者:
Brendan Lucier