A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Deception over Social Networks Using Fake Avatars
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Deception over Social Networks Using Fake Avatars
复制标题
使用虚假头像进行社交网络欺骗的博弈论分析
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-47413-7_22
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Quanyan Zhu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Amin Mohammadi;M. Manshaei;M. M. Moghaddam;Quanyan Zhu
在本文中，我们在网络中制定了一个欺骗游戏，在这个游戏中，防御者部署一个虚假的化身来识别被入侵的内部用户。我们利用信号博弈的方法来研究被部署的虚拟化身在与外部用户交互时的策略。我们考虑这样一种情况：作为防御者的假头像不确定连接的外部用户的类型，该用户可以是普通用户，也可以是攻击者。我们试图帮助防御者选择最佳策略，即提醒系统检测攻击或不报警。为此，我们分析了寻找完美贝叶斯纳什均衡的博弈。我们的分析确定了外部用户是攻击者的概率，防御者应该启动防御机制。
In this paper, we formulate a deception game in networks in which the defender deploys a fake avatar for identification of the compromised internal user. We utilize signaling game to study the strategy of the deployed fake avatar when she interacts with external users. We consider a situation where the fake avatar as the defender is uncertain about the type of a connected external user, which can be a normal user or an attacker. We attempt to help the defender in selecting her best strategy, which is alerting to the system for detecting an attack or not alert. For this purpose, we analyze the game for finding the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. Our analysis determines for which probability of the external user being an attacker, the defender should launch a defending mechanism.