Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
复制标题
受限制领域的多元化规则的策略证明
DOI：
10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
M. Remzi Sanver
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Remzi Sanver
我们给出了一个完整的特征的偏好域的复数规则是策略证明。如果在所有的平局打破规则下都要求防策略性，则防策略域与顶部平凡域重合，其中复数规则的范围最多允许两个选择。当防策略性被削弱以至少在一个平局打破规则下成立时，这种不可能性实际上普遍存在：除非投票人少于5人，否则一个域的顶部琐碎性等同于多数规则的（弱）不可操纵性。我们还描述了两个，三个或四个选民的情况。
We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is strategy-proof. In case strategy-proofness is required to hold under all tie-breaking rules, strategy-proof domains coincide with top-trivial ones where the range of the plurality rule admits at most two alternatives. This impossibility virtually prevails when strategy-proofness is weakened so as to hold under at least one tie-breaking rule: unless there are less than five voters, the top-triviality of a domain is equivalent to the (weak) non-manipulability of the plurality rule. We also characterize the cases with two, three or four voters.