State Ownership and Firm Innovation in China: An Integrated View of Institutional and Efficiency Logics
State Ownership and Firm Innovation in China: An Integrated View of Institutional and Efficiency Logics
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DOI：
10.1177/0001839216674457
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发表时间：
2017-06
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
K. Zhou;Gerald Yong Gao;Hongxin Zhao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Zhou;Gerald Yong Gao;Hongxin Zhao
利用中国制造业企业的两个纵向面板数据集，我们评估了国有产权对企业创新是有益还是有阻碍。我们表明，在新兴经济体中，国有产权使企业能够获得关键的研发资源，但会降低企业利用这些资源进行创新的效率，并且我们发现，在这种情况下，少数股权的国有产权是创新发展的最优结构。此外，当行业竞争激烈以及对于初创企业而言，国有产权将研发投入转化为创新产出的低效性会降低。我们的研究结果整合了效率逻辑（代理理论）和制度逻辑，前者认为国有产权不利于创新，后者则指出新兴经济体的政府对监管政策和稀缺资源的控制具有关键影响。我们讨论了这些研究结果对新兴经济体中国有产权和企业创新研究的启示。
Using two longitudinal panel datasets of Chinese manufacturing firms, we assess whether state ownership benefits or impedes firms’ innovation. We show that state ownership in an emerging economy enables a firm to obtain crucial R&D resources but makes the firm less efficient in using those resources to generate innovation, and we find that a minority state ownership is an optimal structure for innovation development in this context. Moreover, the inefficiency of state ownership in transforming R&D input into innovation output decreases when industrial competition is high, as well as for start-up firms. Our findings integrate the efficiency logic (agency theory), which views state ownership as detrimental to innovation, and institutional logic, which notes that governments in emerging economies have critical influences on regulatory policies and control over scarce resources. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on state ownership and firm innovation in emerging economies.