Pseudonymous Broadcast and Secure Computation from Cryptographic Puzzles
Pseudonymous Broadcast and Secure Computation from Cryptographic Puzzles
复制标题
密码谜题中的假名广播和安全计算
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
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通讯作者：
E. Shi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jonathan Katz;Andrew K. Miller;E. Shi
在安全计算的标准模型中，假定各方之间的点对点通道通过某种预先存在的方法进行身份验证。在其他情况下，甚至更强的预先存在的设置-例如。假设存在公钥基础设施（PKI）。这些假设对于开放的、点对点的网络来说过于强大了，在这种网络中，各方不一定有任何先前的关系，可以随心所欲地来来去去。然而，这些假设是由于普遍的信念，即没有它们就没有“有趣”的东西。从比特币中获得灵感，我们展示了计算能力的精确界限可以用来代替预先存在的设置，以实现较弱（但重要的）安全概念。具体来说，在假设每一方只能以有限的速率（以及数字签名的存在）解决密码谜题的情况下，我们表明，在没有事先设置和对损坏数量没有限制的情况下，一组各方可以就PKI达成一致，然后他们可以通过PKI实现经过身份验证的通信、广播和安全计算的假名概念。粗略地说，这里的“假名”意味着输入/输出绑定到假名，而不是各方的真实身份。∗部门。他是马里兰大学计算机科学专业的教授。电子邮件:{jkatz,阿米尔,伊莲}@cs.umd.edu。†由NSF奖励#0964541，#1111599和#1223623支持的工作。‡工作由NSF奖#1314857、斯隆研究奖学金和谷歌教师研究奖支持。
In standard models of secure computation, point-to-point channels between parties are assumed to be authenticated by some pre-existing means. In other cases, even stronger pre-existing setup—e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI)—is assumed. These assumptions are too strong for open, peer-to-peer networks, where parties do not necessarily have any prior relationships and can come and go as they please. Nevertheless, these assumptions are made due to the prevailing belief that nothing “interesting” can be achieved without them. Taking inspiration from Bitcoin, we show that precise bounds on computational power can be used in place of pre-existing setup to achieve weaker (but nontrivial) notions of security. Specifically, under the assumption that each party can solve cryptographic puzzles only at a bounded rate (and the existence of digital signatures), we show that without prior setup and with no bound on the number of corruptions, a group of parties can agree on a PKI with which they can then realize pseudonymous notions of authenticated communication, broadcast, and secure computation. Roughly, “pseudonymous” here means that inputs/outputs are bound to pseudonyms rather than parties’ true identities. ∗Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland. Email: {jkatz,amiller,elaine}@cs.umd.edu. †Work supported by NSF awards #0964541, #1111599, and #1223623. ‡Work supported by NSF award #1314857, a Sloan Research Fellowship, and a Google Faculty Research Award.