Competition and termination of the alliances between asymmetric partners: The case of Japanese department stores
Competition and termination of the alliances between asymmetric partners: The case of Japanese department stores
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DOI：
10.1007/s10490-014-9383-y
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发表时间：
2014-06
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Junichi Yamanoi;Q. Cao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Junichi Yamanoi;Q. Cao
为了丰富关于联盟终止的文献，我们认识到单个联盟的动态取决于其所嵌入的联盟组合的结构特征。我们的研究立足于大型行业领导者与多个小型合作伙伴的合作背景，后者可以被视为竞争获得前者的资源。我们预计，在领导者的联盟组合中，较小的合作伙伴相对于同伴的相对能力与联盟终止的可能性呈负相关，因为领导者承认能力较差的合作伙伴不值得得到支持。此外，这种关系将受到联盟投资组合规模、与同行合作伙伴的市场重叠以及与行业领导者的市场重叠的调节。利用1977- 1993年期间日本145家大型和小型百货公司联盟的独特数据集，我们发现了对假设关系的普遍支持。
To enrich the literature on alliance termination, we recognize that the dynamics of individual alliances are subject to the structural characteristics of the alliance portfolios in which they are embedded. We anchor our study in the context of large industry leaders partnering with multiple small partners, the latter of which can be viewed as competing for access to the formers’ resources. We expect that a small partner’s relative capability in relation to peer partners within a leader’s alliance portfolio is negatively related to the likelihood of alliance termination, since the leader acknowledges that partners with inferior capability do not deserve to be supported. Furthermore, this relationship would be moderated by alliance portfolio size, market overlap with peer partners, and with industry leaders. Using a unique dataset of 145 alliances between leading and small department stores in Japan in the period 1977-93, we found general support for the hypothesized relationships.