Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations
Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations
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合同重新谈判中的参考点、社会规范和公平性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Klaus M. Schmidt
中科院分区：
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作者：
Björn Bartling;Klaus M. Schmidt
一份事前合同如何影响事后重新谈判游戏中的行为？我们通过重新谈判，以规范的买卖关系来解决这个问题。我们提供的因果实验证据表明，初始合同对重新谈判行为具有非常显著的经济意义，其影响超出了合同对讨价还价威胁点的影响。我们将重新谈判初始合同的情况与没有签订事先合同的战略上等价的讨价还价情况进行比较。事前合同导致卖家要求的加价比没有初始合同的战略对等讨价还价情况下的加价低45%。此外，买家在重新谈判中比在谈判中更有可能拒绝给定的加价。这些影响并不取决于合同是在竞争条件下还是在垄断条件下签订的。我们的结果提供了强有力的证据支持这样的假设，即合同是塑造和协调缔约各方预期的参照点。
How does an ex-ante contract affect behavior in an ex-post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical buyer–seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex-ante contract was written. The ex-ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45% lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. These effects do not depend on whether the contract was written under competitive or monopolistic conditions. Our results provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contracts serve as reference points that shape and coordinate the expectations of the contracting parties.