The crisis of religious legitimacy in Iran: 1019
The crisis of religious legitimacy in Iran: 1019
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伊朗宗教合法性危机：1019
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发表时间：
1999
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
O. Roy
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作者：
O. Roy
伊朗革命建立在宗教和政治双重合法性的基础上，伊玛目鲁霍拉·霍梅尼就是这一合法性的体现。但是，宪法、霍梅尼的统治以及他去世后的政治进程表明，政治方面已经开始主导和界定宗教的作用。这种政治化，伴随着超国家什叶派的伊朗化，导致了事实上的世俗化，实际上破坏了什叶派神职人员力量和独立性的传统基础。1997年5月，穆罕默德·哈塔米当选伊朗总统，这不仅表明民众要求建立一个更加开放和民主的社会，而且表明伊朗宗教合法性危机日益严重。伊朗伊斯兰革命从一开始就明确地以宗教和政治两种合法性的结合为基础，通过Velayat-eFaqih的概念，即“法学家的使命”，这意味着伊斯兰革命的最高权威，即指导或领导人（Rahbar），应该是最高的宗教权威之一（marja或“模仿之源”，复数maradi `）和政治领袖，谁“了解他的时间”（“agah be zaman”），因此可以领导群众运动。但这种一致性只在已故的伊玛目鲁霍拉·霍梅尼身上实现。《宪法》强调霍梅尼既是最高级别的神职人员，也是卓越的政治领袖：因此，《指南》的理想类型是一位在被任命之前就体现了这两种合法性的法学家。无论如何，在他被任命之后，他应该被认为是一个“有学问的牧师”和一个政治领袖。但霍梅尼在1989年的去世意味着这种双重合法性的终结。他的继任者阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊不是一个主要的宗教权威。这就引出了两个问题：《指南》应该主要是一个宗教权威，还是一个政治权威？第二，伊斯兰革命怎么可能通过政治任命绕过当时的最高宗教权威，甚至背弃一些伊斯兰教法的要求？然而，只要从1989年霍梅尼去世到1997年的所有选举（总统和议会）都从相对同质的统治精英中选出候选人，这种概念危机就没有演变成政治危机。但是，1997年5月，哈塔米总统违背《指南》哈梅内伊公开表示的愿望当选，使这两种合法性相互矛盾，尽管新总统当然正式承认《指南》的至高无上地位。如果已经缺乏宗教信仰的《指南》现在正在失去政治支持，那么他的领导权还基于什么合法性？自哈塔米当选以来，我们所看到的是宪法文本中已经存在的矛盾的展开：在宗教革命中，如伊朗伊斯兰革命，宗教的地位和作用仍然是由政治机构，而不是宗教机构定义的。政治凌驾于宗教之上。宗教合法性的危机导致了政治的至高无上，并随之导致了事实上的世俗化。不仅在民主主义者和自由主义者中间，而且在传统的神职人员中间，有一种日益增长的趋势，即把宗教和政治分开，这一次是为了把伊斯兰教从政治中拯救出来，而不是像西欧大多数世俗化进程那样，把政治从宗教中拯救出来。我们可以区分出四个层次的危机：概念、宗教、政治和宗教，导致不同行动者的立场复杂多样。正如我们将看到的，在伊朗，要把“激进派”和“温和派”、“保守派”和“自由派”、“传统主义者”和“现代主义者”对立起来有点困难，更不用说“左派”和“右派”了。如果说哈塔米可以称得上是自由派、温和派和现代主义者的话，那么他的许多支持者来自激进派（特别是来自美国大使馆的人质劫持者，如穆罕默德·穆萨维·霍埃尼哈和阿里·阿克巴尔·穆赫塔希米），或者来自“中央集权左派”，如米尔-侯赛因·穆萨维或阿亚图拉哈桑·萨那伊，他的基金会正在推动要求处死英国作家萨尔曼·拉什迪的法特瓦。…
The Iranian Revolution was founded on a dual legitimacy, religious and political, which was embodied by Imam Ruhollah Khomeini. But the Constitution, the rulings of Khomeini, and the political process since his demise show that the political aspect has come to dominate and define the role of religion. This politicization, accompanied by an Iranization of supranational Shi'ism, leads to a de facto secularization, and actually undermines the traditional basis of the strength and independence of the Shi'i clergy. The election of Iranian President Muhammad Khatami in May 1997 was an expression not only of a popular call for a more open and democratic society, but also of the increasing crisis of religious legitimacy in Iran. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was, from its inception, explicitly based on the conjunction of two legitimacies, religious and political, through the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, "the Mandate of the Jurist," meaning that the highest authority of the Islamic Revolution, the Guide or Leader (Rahbar), should be both one of the highest religious authorities (marja or "source of imitation," plural maradi `) and the political leader, who "understands his time" ("agah be zaman") and therefore could lead a mass movement. But this congruence was realized only in the late Imam Ruhollah Khomeini's person. The Constitution stressed that Khomeini was both the highest ranking cleric and the political leader par excellence: thus, the ideal type of the Guide is a faqih (jurist) who embodies both legitimacies, before his appointment. And, in any case, after his appointment, he should be considered as both a "learned cleric" and a political leader. But Khomeini's death in 1989 meant the end of this double legitimacy. His successor as Guide, Ayatollah `Ali Khamene'i, was not a leading religious authority. This led to two questions: should the Guide be primarily a leading religious authority, or a political one? Second, how could an Islamic revolution bypass, through a political appointment, the highest religious authorities of the time, and even turn its back on some shari'a (Islamic law) requirements? Nevertheless, this conceptual crisis did not turn into a political one as long as all elections (presidential and parliamentary) selected candidates from a relatively homogeneous ruling elite from the time of Khomeini's death in 1989 until 1997. But, in May 1997, President Khatami was elected against the avowed wishes of the Guide, Khamene'i, bringing the two legitimacies into contradiction, even though, of course, the new president officially recognized the supremacy of the Guide. If the Guide, who already lacked some religious credentials, is now losing his political support, on which legitimacy is his leadership still based? What we are witnessing since Khatami's election is the unfolding of a contradiction which already existed in the text of the Constitution: in a religious revolution, such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the status and role of religion is nevertheless defined by political institutions, not religious ones. Politics rule over religion. The crisis of the religious legitimacy is leading to the supremacy of politics, and subsequently to a de facto secularization. There is a growing tendency, not only among democrats and liberals, but also traditional clerics, to separate religion and politics, this time in order to save Islam from politics, and not, as was the case in most of the processes of secularization in Western Europe, to save politics from religion. We can distinguish four levels of crisis: conceptual, clerical, political, and religious, leading to a complex array of positions from the different actors. As we shall see, it is a bit difficult in Iran to oppose "radicals" and "moderates," "conservatives" and "liberals," "traditionalists" and "modernists," not to speak of "leftists" and "rightists." If Khatami might qualify as a liberal, a moderate and a modernist, many of his supporters came from the radical side (and specifically from the American Embassy hostage-takers, such as Muhammad Musavi Kho'einiha and `Ali Akbar Mohtashemi), or from the "statist-leftist" side, like Mir-Hosein Musavi or Ayatollah Hassan Sana'i, whose foundation is promoting the fatwa calling for the death of British writer Salman Rushdie. …