SiBIR: Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient Signatures
SiBIR: Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient Signatures
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DOI：
10.1007/3-540-45708-9_32
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发表时间：
2002-08
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通讯作者：
G. Itkis;Leonid Reyzin
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文献类型：
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作者：
G. Itkis;Leonid Reyzin
本文提出了一种新的基于签名者的抗入侵签名方案（SiBIR），它是前向安全的[And 97]、[BM 99]和密钥隔离的[DKXY 02]签名方案的推广和改进。具体地，如在先前的概念中，时间被划分为预定义的时间段（例如，天）;每个签名包括其生成的时间段的编号;当公钥保持不变时，密钥随着时间而演变。此外，在密钥隔离方案中，用户有两个模块，签名者和家庭基地：签名者自己生成签名，基地只需要帮助更新签名者的密钥从一个周期到下一个周期。入侵弹性方案的主要优势，而不是以前的概念，是他们仍然是安全的，即使在任意多个妥协的两个模块，只要妥协不是同时发生的。此外，即使入侵者同时入侵两个模块，她仍然无法生成任何签名的前一个时间periods.We提供了一个有效的入侵弹性签名方案，可证明安全的随机预言模型的基础上强RSA假设。我们还讨论了如何这样的计划可以消除需要证书撤销的情况下，在线认证。
We propose a new notion ofsigner-base intrusion-resilient (SiBIR) signatures, which generalizes and improves upon both forwardsecure [And97],[BM99] and key-insulated [DKXY02] signature schemes. Specifically, as in the prior notions, time is divided into predefined time periods (e.g., days); each signature includes the number of the time period in which it was generated; while the public key remains the same, the secret keys evolve with time. Also, as in key-insulated schemes, the user has two modules,signerandhome base: the signer generates signatures on his1own, and the base is needed only to help update the signer’s key from one period to the next.The main strength of intrusion-resilient schemes, as opposed to prior notions, is that they remain secure even afterarbitrarily manycompromises ofbothmodules, as long as the compromises are not simultaneous. Moreover, even if the intruder does compromise both modules simultaneously, she will still be unable to generate any signatures for the previous time periods.We provide an efficient intrusion-resilient signature scheme, provably secure in the random oracle model based on the strong RSA assumption. We also discuss how such schemes can eliminate the need for certificate revocation in the case of on-line authentication.