NATURE AND PLAUSIBILITY OF COGNITIVISM
NATURE AND PLAUSIBILITY OF COGNITIVISM
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DOI：
10.1017/s0140525x00074148
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发表时间：
1978-01-01
影响因子：
29.3
通讯作者：
HAUGELAND, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
HAUGELAND, J
心理学和哲学中的认知主义大致是这样一种立场，即智力行为只能通过诉诸内在的“认知过程”来解释，也就是非常广泛意义上的理性思维。第一节到第五节试图详细地阐述这种直觉所激发的科学事业的性质。这项事业至少有三个方面的独特之处：它依赖于一种不同于数学物理的解释风格，在这种方式上，它基本上不涉及定量方程定律；它所处理的状态和过程被“解释”，从某种意义上说，它们被认为是有意义的或代表性的；它不致力于简化论，但对不同于其他科学中遇到的形式的简化持开放态度。拼写这些点清楚地表明，认知主义对心灵的研究可以是严谨的和经验性的，尽管它是前所未有的理论形式。哲学解释还有另一个好处：它为阐明认知主义方法是对还是错的问题提供了一个亟需的框架。最后三个部分利用了这一点，并解决了几个这样的问题，赞成和反对。
Cognitivism in psychology and philosophy is roughly the position that intelligent behavior can (only) be explained by appeal to internal “cognitive processes,” that is, rational thought in a very broad sense. Sections 1 to 5 attempt to explicate in detail the nature of the scientific enterprise that this intuition has inspired. That enterprise is distinctive in at least three ways: It relies on a style of explanation which is different from that of mathematical physics, in such a way that it is not basically concerned with quantitative equational laws; the states and processes with which it deals are “interpreted,” in the sense that they are regarded as meaningful or representational; and it is not committed to reductionism, but is open to reduction in a form different from that encountered in other sciences. Spelling these points out makes it clear that the Cognitivist study of the mind can be rigorous and empirical, despite its unprecedented theoretical form. The philosophical explication has another advantage as well: It provides a much needed framework for articulating questions about whether the Cognitivist approach is right or wrong. The last three sections take that advantage of the account, and address several such questions, pro and con.