Burden of Proof
Burden of Proof
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举证责任
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1954006
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Kaplow
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Kaplow
举证责任是所有裁判制度的一个核心特征，但对这一特征的规范分析却很少。本文探讨了如何强有力的证据应该有为了分配责任时，目标是最大限度地提高社会福利。在基本情况下，威慑利益和冷却成本之间存在权衡，最佳证据要求由几乎完全不同于证据规则和其他传统标准优势的因素决定。因此，这些熟悉的举证责任规则有一些令人惊讶的特性，就像已经提出的替代标准一样。本文还考虑了举证责任的设定如何与法律的制度设计的其他特征相互作用，如执行力度的确定和裁决的准确程度。它比较和对比了各种法律的环境和执法方法，解释了适当的证据要求如何在不同的情况下有质的不同。所提出的大多数问题和所提供的答案在种类和结果上都与以前的文献不同。
The burden of proof is a central feature of all systems of adjudication, yet one that has been subject to little normative analysis. This Article examines how strong evidence should have to be in order to assign liability when the objective is to maximize social welfare. In basic settings, there is a tradeoff between deterrence benefits and chilling costs, and the optimal proof requirement is determined by factors that are almost entirely distinct from those underlying the preponderance of the evidence rule and other traditional standards. As a consequence, these familiar burden of proof rules have some surprising properties, as do alternative criteria that have been advanced. The Article also considers how setting the proof burden interacts with other features of legal system design, such as the determination of enforcement effort and the degree of accuracy of adjudication. It compares and contrasts a variety of legal environments and methods of enforcement, explaining how the appropriate evidence requirements differ qualitatively across contexts. Most of the questions raised and answers presented differ in kind — as well as in result — from those in prior literature.