How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing
How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing
复制标题
如何（不）分配经济适用房
DOI：
10.1145/3033274.3085157
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Peng Shi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Arnosti;Peng Shi
我们考虑一个设置，其中代理和项目随时间动态匹配。我们的研究表明，重复的、不受限制的独立彩票（在实践中通常使用）鼓励代理参加许多彩票，并可能导致低匹配值。我们考虑了三种替代机制：允许代理保存未使用的门票，限制代理最多只能参加一次抽奖，以及使用等待列表分配开发项目。我们证明了这三种机制是等价的：对于每个agent，匹配的概率和以匹配为条件的期望值是相同的。与重复抽签相比，这些机制为匹配代理带来更高质量的匹配。然而，在某些情况下，重复抽签更有可能将代理人与最差的外部选择匹配起来，因此在功利主义福利方面可能优于其他机制。我们讨论了这些发现对纽约市目前使用重复彩票的两个系统的影响：经济适用房的分配和百老汇演出的折扣门票。
We consider a setting in which agents and items match dynamically over time. We show that repeated independent lotteries with unlimited entry (which are commonly used in practice) encourage agents to enter many lotteries, and may result in low match value. We consider three alternate mechanisms: allowing agents to save unused tickets, limiting agents to entering at most one lottery, and allocating developments using a waiting list. We show that these three mechanisms are equivalent: for each agent, the probability of matching and expected value conditioned on matching are identical. Compared to a repeated lottery, these mechanisms result in higher-quality matches for matched agents. However, in some cases, a repeated lottery is more likely to match agents with the worst outside options, and thus may outperform the other mechanisms in terms of utilitarian welfare. We discuss the implications of these findings for two systems in New York City that currently use a repeated lottery: the allocation of affordable housing and of discounted tickets to broadway shows.