Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining
Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining
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名义议价能力、选择协议和立法议价中的折扣
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.009
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
M. Morelli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Guillaume Fréchette;J. Kagel;M. Morelli
Baron和Ferreohn的比较静态预测[Baron，D. P.，和Ferjohn，J.A.，（1989年）。在立法机构的谈判，美国政治科学评论83（4），1181-1206]模型更好地组织行为在立法谈判实验比甘姆森的法律。回归类似于那些在现场数据产生的结果似乎在支持Gamson定律（即使使用的数据模拟代理人谁的行为根据男爵Ferreohn模型），但这是由选择协议所确定的，该协议承认投票块成比例的选票控制的数量。提议者的权力并不像封闭规则Baron和Ferreohn模型中预测的那样强大，因为联盟伙伴拒绝接受游戏继续值所给出的小份额。贴现会将行为推向Baron和Ferejohn预测的方向，但影响比预测的要小得多。
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181–1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron–Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.