Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange
复制标题
通过平衡交换进行双边匹配
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
M. Utku Ünver
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
U. Dur;M. Utku Ünver
我们引入了一个新的匹配模型来模仿双边交流计划，如学费和工人交流，其中需要进出口平衡的长寿计划。这些交易所使用分散的市场，因此很难实现这一目标。我们引入了双边顶部交易周期，这是一种独特的机制，它是平衡高效的，工人策略证明，可接受的，个人理性的，并尊重关于工人资格的优先章程。此外，它鼓励交换，因为充分参与会导致公司的优势战略均衡。我们将其扩展到允许可容忍的年度不平衡的动态设置，并证明其常规和可容忍版本的性能比当前实践模型要好得多。
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchanges, in which export-import balances are required for longevity of programs. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve this goal. We introduce the two-sided top trading cycles, the unique mechanism that is balanced-efficient, worker-strategy-proof, acceptable, individually rational, and respecting priority bylaws regarding worker eligibility. Moreover, it encourages exchange, because full participation induces a dominant-strategy equilibrium for firms. We extend it to dynamic settings permitting tolerable yearly imbalances and demonstrate that its regular and tolerable versions perform considerably better than models of current practice.