Designing Targeting Rules for International Monetary Policy Cooperation
Designing Targeting Rules for International Monetary Policy Cooperation
复制标题
设计国际货币政策合作的目标规则
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.03.009
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Pierpaolo Benigno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gianluca Benigno;Pierpaolo Benigno
本文分析了具有名义刚性、垄断竞争和生产者货币定价的两国动态一般均衡模型。推导了消费者效用的二次逼近，并将其作为决策者的政策目标函数。研究表明，只有在特殊条件下，合作才不会产生收益，而且在约束有效解中，汇率和价格的路径取决于影响经济的干扰类型。尽管这样的结果，简单的目标规则，只涉及目标的产出增长和国内GDP和CPI通胀率可以复制合作分配。
This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers. It is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the constrained-efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy. Despite this result, simple targeting rules that involve only targets for the growth of output and for both domestic GDP and CPI inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation.