Internal correlation in repeated games
Internal correlation in repeated games
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重复博弈的内部相关性
DOI：
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发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Lehrer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Lehrer
本文描述了两个参与者重复博弈中所有纳什均衡收益的集合，其中参与者在每个阶段得到的信号要么是微不足道的（不透露任何信息），要么是标准的（信号是所采取的一对行动）。如果信息不总是平凡的那么所有纳什均衡收益的集合与相关均衡收益的集合是一致的。特别地，任何一次博弈的相关均衡收益也是重复博弈的纳什均衡收益。为了证明这一点，我们开发了一个方案，通过该方案，两个玩家可以使用游戏的信号结构生成任何相关设备。我们提出的策略与玩家内部关联他们的行动，而不需要外生中介。
This paper characterizes the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs in two player repeated games where the signal that the players get after each stage is either trivial (does not reveal any information) or standard (the signal is the pair of actions played). It turns out that if the information is not always trivial then the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs coincides with the set of the correlated equilibrium payoffs. In particular, any correlated equilibrium payoff of the one shot game is also a Nash equilibrium payoff of the repeated game.For the proof we develop a scheme by which two players can generate any correlation device, using the signaling structure of the game. We present strategies with which the players internally correlate their actions without the need of an exogenous mediator.