The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation
The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation
复制标题
市场的范围和监管的供给
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Andrei Shleifer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Mulligan;Andrei Shleifer
我们提出了一个模型，其中设置和运行的监管机构需要一个固定的成本。因此，监管的供应受到市场范围的限制。我们测试这个模型的三个含义。首先，受特定法规影响的人口较多的司法管辖区更有可能实施该法规;其次，引入和实施新法规的增量固定成本较低的司法管辖区应该实施更多法规。这意味着监管从人口较多的管辖区向人口较少的管辖区扩散，建立可转移监管能力的管辖区应加强监管。与该模型一致，我们发现人口越多，U。S.与较小的国家相比，各州的立法篇幅更多，而且在其历史上通过特定法律的时间更早。我们还发现，在人口较多的国家，入境管制、劳动力管制和征兵制更为广泛，在大陆法系国家，我们认为增量固定成本较低。
We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower.