The state as person in international theory
The state as person in international theory
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国际理论中的国家作为人
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Alexander Wendt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alexander Wendt
说国家是“行动者”或“人”，就是赋予它们我们首先与人类联系在一起的属性——理性、身份、利益、信仰等等。这种归因尤其普遍存在于社会科学和国际关系（IR）学术领域。它们存在于现实主义者、自由主义者、制度主义者、马克思主义者、建构主义者、行为主义者、女权主义者、后现代主义者、国际律师以及几乎所有介于两者之间的人的作品中。诚然，对于个人的哪些属性应归属于国家、国家个人相对于跨国公司或非政府组织等其他法人的重要性、国家个人是否是一件好事以及“失败”的国家是否可以或应该成为个人等问题，学者们存在分歧。但所有这些讨论都假设国家人格的概念是有意义的，并且在某些基本层面上是有道理的。在一个几乎所有事情都存在争议的领域，这似乎是我们几乎所有人都同意的一件事。
To say that states are ‘actors’ or ‘persons’ is to attribute to them properties we associate first with human beings – rationality, identities, interests, beliefs, and so on. Such attributions pervade social science and International Relations (IR) scholarship in particular. They are found in the work of realists, liberals, institutionalists, Marxists, constructivists, behaviouralists, feminists, postmodernists, international lawyers, and almost everyone in between. To be sure, scholars disagree about which properties of persons should be ascribed to states, how important state persons are relative to other corporate persons like MNCs or NGOs, whether state persons are a good thing, and whether ‘failed’ states can or should be persons at all. But all this discussion assumes that the idea of state personhood is meaningful and at some fundamental level makes sense. In a field in which almost everything is contested, this seems to be one thing on which almost all of us agree.