A Bidding Game in a Continuum Limit Order Book
A Bidding Game in a Continuum Limit Order Book
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连续限价订单簿中的竞价游戏
DOI:
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发表时间:
2013
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Giancarlo Facchi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
A. Bressan;Giancarlo Facchi
The paper is concerned with a continuum model of the limit order book, viewed as a noncooperative game for $n$ players. An external buyer asks for a random amount $X > 0$ of a given asset. This amount will be bought at the lowest available price, as long as the price does not exceed a given upper bound $overline{P}$. One or more sellers offer various quantities of the asset at different prices, competing to fulfill the incoming order, whose size is not known a priori. The first part of the paper deals with solutions to the measure-valued optimal pricing problem for a single player, proving an existence result and deriving necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. The second part is devoted to Nash equilibria. For a general class of random variables $X$ and an arbitrary number of players, the existence and uniqueness of the corresponding Nash equilibrium is proved, explicitly determining the pricing strategy of each player. For a different class of random variables, it is shown that no Nash equi...