The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: Evidence from Spain
The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: Evidence from Spain
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董事会构成及其监督委员会对盈余管理的影响：来自西班牙的证据
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00654.x
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Noguer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Beatriz García Osma;B. Noguer
我们测试是否公司治理机制促进了最佳实践守则是有效的，在1999年至2001年期间，在西班牙样本的上市公司的盈余操纵。特别是，我们分析了盈余管理和公司治理的两个关键方面：董事会组成和董事会监督委员会的存在之间的关联。我们的研究结果表明，董事会组成在很大程度上决定了盈利操纵行为。然而，正如英国和美国的研究所表明的那样，在限制这种做法方面发挥主要作用的不是独立董事，而是机构董事。独立审计委员会的存在和盈余管理措施之间没有相关性。最后，提名委员会的存在和组成会影响独立董事在抑制盈余操纵方面的作用。版权所有（c）2007作者;期刊汇编（c）2007布莱克威尔出版有限公司。
We test whether corporate governance mechanisms promoted by best practice codes are effective in constraining earnings manipulation for a Spanish sample of quoted companies during the period 1999-2001. In particular, we analyse the association between earnings management and two key aspects of corporate governance: board composition and the existence of board monitoring committees. Our results show that board composition significantly determines earnings manipulation practices. However, the main role in constraining such practices is not played by independent directors, as UK and US based research suggests, but by institutional directors. No correlation is found between the existence of an independent audit committee and earnings management measures. Finally, the existence and composition of a nomination committee affects the role of independent directors in constraining earnings manipulation. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.