Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment
Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment
复制标题
无需承诺的收入和储蓄的最优非线性税收
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12328
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
J. Weymark
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Brett;J. Weymark
在两阶段模型中考虑了收入和储蓄的最优非线性税收，两个人具有可分离的偏好，并且他们的技能水平不同。当政府能够承诺其第二阶段的政策时，对储蓄的税收并不构成最优税收组合的一部分。当承诺不可能时，最优税收制度扭曲了私人储蓄行为。如果在第一阶段将这两种类型分开，最好是对高技能个人的储蓄征税，对低技能个人的储蓄征税，税率较低，可能为负。如果在第一阶段将这些类型集中起来，那么低技能（高技能）个人面临边际储蓄税（补贴）是最优的。在这两种情况下，高技能个人的储蓄都被扭曲了，因为这个人理性地预期，他的一些储蓄将在第二阶段重新分配给低技能个人。在离职情况下，低技能个人的储蓄以较低的税率征税，以放松激励相容性约束。
Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit to its second period policy, taxes on savings do not form part of the optimal tax mix. When commitment is not possible, the optimal tax scheme distorts private savings behavior. If the types are separated in period one, it is optimal to tax the savings of the high-skilled individual and to tax the savings of the low-skilled individual at a lower, possibly negative, rate. If the types are pooled in period one, it is optimal for the low-skilled (high-skilled) individual to face a marginal savings tax (subsidy). In both cases, the savings of the high-skilled individual are distorted because this individual rationally expects that some of his savings will be redistributed to the low-skilled individual in the second period. The savings of the low-skilled individual in the separating case are taxed at a lower rate so as to relax an incentive compatibility constraint.