The provision of lighthouses services: a political economy perspective
The provision of lighthouses services: a political economy perspective
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提供灯塔服务：政治经济学视角
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-012-9951-y
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
L. Carnis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Carnis
罗纳德科斯1974年关于灯塔和Trinity House案例的文章引发了关于公共产品概念的广泛辩论，也引发了关于私人生产公共产品的可能性的辩论。由此产生的文献讨论了私有财产的概念和公共产品的特征，并提供了一个经济分析的灯塔的地位，这一贡献的灯塔是一种资产，受政治寻租的经济政策的背景下，展开了辩论。因此，它强调了这样一个事实，即竞争和排斥的特点，界定了公共利益，实际上是由政府，决定了灯塔所产生的服务的性质，机构设置的重量，加上政治竞争的控制灯塔，要求有关寻租的解释。在这方面，灯塔在成为资本资产之前，已经成为一种政治物品，是某些人的收入来源。
Ronald Coase’s 1974 article on lighthouses and the Trinity House case, in particular, has triggered extensive debate on the notion of a public good, but also on the possibility of private production of public goods. The resultant literature has discussed the concept of private property and the characteristics of a public good, and offered an economic analysis of the status of lighthouses.This contribution sets out to situate the debate in the context of an economic policy for which the lighthouse is an asset subject to political rent seeking. Thus, it highlights the fact that the characteristics of rivalry and exclusion, which define the public good, are in fact influenced by governments, which decide the nature of the services produced by lighthouses.The weight of the institutional setting, together with political competition for the control of lighthouses, calls for interpretation relating to rent seeking. In this respect, the lighthouse, prior to being a capital asset, has already emerged as a political object that is a source of revenue for certain individuals.