InvisiPage: Oblivious Demand Paging for Secure Enclaves
InvisiPage: Oblivious Demand Paging for Secure Enclaves
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DOI：
10.1145/3307650.3322265
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发表时间：
2019-06
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通讯作者：
Shaizeen Aga;S. Narayanasamy
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文献类型：
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作者：
Shaizeen Aga;S. Narayanasamy
英特尔SGX等最先进的安全处理器仍然容易通过页面错误通道泄漏应用程序的页面级地址跟踪，恶意操作系统在该通道中诱导虚假页面错误并从中推断应用程序的秘密。修复此漏洞的现有工作没有规定操作系统要求分页是不经意的。在这项工作中，我们提出了Incredible页混淆页面故障通道，同时使操作系统的需求分页遗忘。为了做到这一点，Incredible Page首先仔细地在应用程序和操作系统之间分配页面管理操作。其次，Incredible Page使用一种新颖的结构来保护应用程序与操作系统的页面管理交互，该结构源自不经意RAM（ORAM），但专为页面管理而定制。最后，我们通过一个新的内存分区减少页面管理与操作系统的交互，降低了我们的方法的开销。对于一套处理敏感数据的云应用程序，我们表明，页面错误通道可以解决，同时使不经意的需求分页在低开销。
State-of-art secure processors like Intel SGX remain susceptible to leaking page-level address trace of an application via the page fault channel in which a malicious OS induces spurious page faults and deduces application's secrets from it. Prior works which fix this vulnerability do not provision for OS demand paging to be oblivious. In this work, we present InvisiPage which obfuscates page fault channel while simultaneously making OS demand paging oblivious. To do so, InvisiPage first carefully distributes page management actions between the application and the OS. Second, InvisiPage secures application's page management interactions with the OS using a novel construct which is derived from Oblivious RAM (ORAM) but is customized for page management. Finally, we lower overheads of our approach by reducing page management interactions with the OS via a novel memory partition. For a suite of cloud applications which process sensitive data we show that page fault channel can be tackled while enabling oblivious demand paging at low overheads.