Objectivity, Impartiality, and Hermeneutics in the Leibnizian-Wolffian Debates between 1720 and 1750
Objectivity, Impartiality, and Hermeneutics in the Leibnizian-Wolffian Debates between 1720 and 1750
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1720 年至 1750 年间莱布尼茨与沃尔夫争论中的客观性、公正性和诠释学
DOI:
10.1163/9789004260849_012
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发表时间:
2014
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Hanns-Peter Neumann
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文献类型:
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作者:
Hanns-Peter Neumann
In my paper I will not focus on the concrete debates between Wolffians and Newtonians on the one side, and between Wolffians and Pietist and Lutheran theologians on the other. The debates between Wolffians and Newtonians continued the controversies between Leibniz and Newton on physical and metaphysical subjects, ie, among others, on the question of whether the mathematical notion of space can be transferred to reality, like Newton once maintained with his famous definition of space as sensorium Dei, or whether space is rather an organizing instrument of the human mind representing the simultaneous order of things in terms of spatial relations, as Leibniz and his follower Wolff claimed. These and other questions were intensively discussed in the famous correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, who gave Newton his voice, in 1715/1716. This correspondence was of eminent importance for the later debates between the Newtonians at the Prussian court (like Maupertuis and others) and Wolff and the Leibniz-Wolffians in the 1740s. The struggles between Wolff and the Pietist theologians in Halle, who accused Wolff of fatalism and atheism, had a much stronger impact on Wolff’s biography than his discussions with the Newtonian mathematicians. They eventually led to the exile of Wolff from Halle by the Prussian King Frederick Wilhelm I on pain of the death penalty in 1723. It was even generally forbidden to teach Wolffian philosophy at Prussian universities until the late 1730s, when the ban on Wolffian philosophy was lifted by Frederick Wilhelm I. In 1740, Wolff was fully rehabilitated by Frederick the Great and could then return to Halle, after he had taught logic and metaphysics at the University of Marburg since 1724 for about seventeen years. Instead of describing the contexts, circumstances, and arguments of these debates in historical detail, I shall examine Christian Wolff’s use of the word or concept of impartiality within these contexts and debates more systematically. I hope that this systematic approach will serve to