Functional dynamic by intention recognition in iterated games
Functional dynamic by intention recognition in iterated games
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DOI：
10.1088/1367-2630/ab0459
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发表时间：
2018-09
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Yuma Fujimoto;K. Kaneko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yuma Fujimoto;K. Kaneko
意图识别是智能代理的一个重要特征。在与他人的互动中，他们试图阅读他人的意图，并对他人进行形象化，从而选择相应的行动。虽然在博弈论中已经研究了玩家根据这种意图选择他们的行动的方式，但是如何通过相互阅读他人的意图来将意图的动态变化纳入博弈论还没有被探索。我们提出了一种新的制定博弈论中，玩家阅读他人的意图，并通过迭代游戏改变自己的。在这里，意图是作为一个函数的其他的行动和自己的行动采取相应的应变量，而相互承认的意图表示为功能动力学。结果表明，一个球员没有遭受不利时，他/她认识到对方的意图，而功能动力学达到均衡，其中两个球员的意图是最优化的。这些涵盖了经典的纳什均衡和斯塔克伯格均衡，但我们在这项研究中扩展了它们：新的均衡存在依赖于相互认可的程度。此外，每个玩家识别对方的程度也可能不同。这一提法适用于资源竞争，双寡头垄断和囚徒困境游戏。例如，在获得资源的能力依赖于玩家的资源竞争游戏中，上级玩家的认可导致对对方的剥削，而下级玩家的认可导致合作，通过合作，双方玩家的收益都增加。
Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others’ intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which players choose their actions depending on such intentions has been investigated in game theory, how dynamic changes in intentions by mutually reading others’ intentions are incorporated into game theory has not been explored. We present a novel formulation of game theory in which players read others’ intentions and change their own through an iterated game. Here, intention is given as a function of the other’s action and the own action to be taken accordingly as the dependent variable, while the mutual recognition of intention is represented as the functional dynamics. It is shown that a player suffers no disadvantage when he/she recognizes the other’s intention, whereas the functional dynamics reach equilibria in which both players’ intentions are optimized. These cover a classical Nash and Stackelberg equilibria but we extend them in this study: Novel equilibria exist depending on the degree of mutual recognition. Moreover, the degree to which each player recognizes the other can also differ. This formulation is applied to resource competition, duopoly, and prisoner’s dilemma games. For example, in the resource competition game with player-dependent capacity on gaining the resource, the superior player’s recognition leads to the exploitation of the other, while the inferior player’s recognition leads to cooperation through which both players’ payoffs increase.