Leaders and competitors
Leaders and competitors
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-012-0271-y
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发表时间：
2012-03
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Susumu Cato;Ryoko Oki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Susumu Cato;Ryoko Oki
本文的目的是研究有领导者的市场的均衡性质。特别地，我们研究了均衡值如何依赖于现有竞争者。当竞争对手的数量是外生给定时，大多数均衡值，包括领导者的战略，取决于竞争对手的结构：现有竞争对手的数量、他们的技术和他们的目标函数。相反，当进入者是内生的时，均衡值（不仅包括领导者的战略，也包括进入者的战略）与现有竞争者的这些属性无关。我们提供了我们的主要结果在产业组织问题上的几个应用。
The purpose of this article is to investigate the properties of equilibrium in a market with a leader. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium values depend on existing competitors. When the number of competitors is exogenously given, most equilibrium values, including the leader’s strategies, depend on the structure of the competitors: the number of incumbent competitors, their technologies, and their objective functions. In contrast, when an entry is endogenous, the equilibrium values, including not only the leader’s strategies but the entrants’ as well, are independent of such properties of the incumbent competitors. We provide several applications of our main result in industrial organization issues.