A network approach to cartel detection in public auction markets

A network approach to cartel detection in public auction markets
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公开拍卖市场中卡特尔检测的网络方法

DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
4.6
通讯作者:
J. Kertész
J. Kertész
中科院分区:
综合性期刊3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Johannes Wachs;J. Kertész

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相互竞争的公司可以通过集体定价来增加利润,给消费者带来巨大的成本。这种公司集团被称为卡特尔,因为这种行为是非法的,他们的行动是秘密的,难以发现。卡特尔感受到了一个重大的内部障碍:成员国感受到了欺骗的短期激励。在这里,我们提出了一个基于网络的框架来检测潜在的卡特尔在投标市场的基础上的想法,一组公司可以克服这个障碍,并维持合作的机会取决于它的互动模式。我们创建了一个网络的公司的基础上,他们的共同投标行为,检测相互作用的群体,并衡量他们的凝聚力和排他性,两个群体的集体行为水平的特点。应用到市场上的学生奶,我们的方法检测到一个已知的卡特尔,并计算出它具有很高的凝聚力和排他性。在格鲁吉亚共和国2011年至2016年授予的近15万份公共合同中,被发现的具有高度凝聚力和排他性的群体更有可能表现出卡特尔行为的传统标志。我们复制组的拓扑结构和出现的合作模拟模型之间的关系。我们的方法提出了一个可扩展的,无监督的方法来寻找投标市场上的公司集团,理想的定位,形成持久的卡特尔。
Competing firms can increase profits by setting prices collectively, imposing significant costs on consumers. Such groups of firms are known as cartels and because this behavior is illegal, their operations are secretive and difficult to detect. Cartels feel a significant internal obstacle: members feel short-run incentives to cheat. Here we present a network-based framework to detect potential cartels in bidding markets based on the idea that the chance a group of firms can overcome this obstacle and sustain cooperation depends on the patterns of its interactions. We create a network of firms based on their co-bidding behavior, detect interacting groups, and measure their cohesion and exclusivity, two group-level features of their collective behavior. Applied to a market for school milk, our method detects a known cartel and calculates that it has high cohesion and exclusivity. In a comprehensive set of nearly 150,000 public contracts awarded by the Republic of Georgia from 2011 to 2016, detected groups with high cohesion and exclusivity are significantly more likely to display traditional markers of cartel behavior. We replicate this relationship between group topology and the emergence of cooperation in a simulation model. Our method presents a scalable, unsupervised method to find groups of firms in bidding markets ideally positioned to form lasting cartels.
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/aa6ea1
发表时间: 2017-07-12
影响因子: 3.3
作者:
Battiston, Federico;Perc, Matjaz;Latora, Vito
通讯作者: Latora, Vito