Public Good Provision Games on Networks with Resource Pooling
Public Good Provision Games on Networks with Resource Pooling
复制标题
资源池网络上的公共物品供给博弈
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_16
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mohammad Mahdi Khalili;Xueru Zhang;M. Liu
我们认为，战略代理人的相互作用和他们的决策过程中提供一个公共产品。在这种交互中，每个用户都在一定程度上努力提高自己的效用。同时，Agent之间是相互依赖的，每个Agent的效用不仅取决于他自己的努力，而且还取决于其他Agent的努力水平。由于代理人的预算有限，能够作出的努力有限，因此出现了代理人集中资源是否有利的问题。在这项研究中，我们表明，资源池可能会或可能不会提高代理人的效用时，他们被驱动的自我利益。我们确定了一些情况下，资源汇集导致社会福利的改善相比，没有资源汇集。我们还提出了一个税收补贴机制，可以有效地激励代理人发挥社会最优努力下的资源集中。
We consider the interaction of strategic agents and their decision-making process toward the provision of a public good. In this interaction, each user exerts a certain level of effort to improve his own utility. At the same time, the agents are interdependent and the utility of each agent depends not only on his own effort but also on the other agents’ effort level. As the agents have a limited budget and can exert limited effort, question arises as to whether there is advantage to agents pooling their resources. In this study, we show that resource pooling may or may not improve the agents’ utility when they are driven by self-interest. We identify some scenarios where resource pooling does lead to social welfare improvement as compared to without resource pooling. We also propose a taxation–subsidy mechanism that can effectively incentivize the agents to exert socially optimal effort under resource pooling.