Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game
Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2002.12.001
复制
发表时间：
2004-03-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Magan, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ben-Ner, A;Putterman, L;Magan, D
我们进行了一个独裁者游戏实验，在第一个游戏中的接受者在第二个游戏中成为独裁者。当受试者配对保持不变时，发送的金额与收到的金额密切相关，尽管事实上这种互动是匿名的，并且是一次性和零和的。当最初的收件人与第三个主题配对时，收到和发送的金额之间的相关性就不那么显著，价值也更低。智力和性格测试结果、性别和其他特征也有助于预测发送行为和互惠程度。(C) 2003 Elsevier b.v.版权所有
We conduct a dictator game experiment in which recipients in an initial game become dictators in a second game. When the subjects paired remain the same, the amount sent back is strongly correlated with the amount received despite the fact that the interaction is anonymous and is known to be one-time and zero-sum in nature. When the initial recipient is instead paired with a third subject, a less significant and lower-valued correlation between amounts received and sent is exhibited. Intelligence and personality test results, gender, and other characteristics also help to predict sending behavior and degree of reciprocity. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.