Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
复制标题
配给规则和稳定的联盟结构
DOI：
10.3982/te2870
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
E. Iñarra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Oihane Gallo;E. Iñarra
本文介绍了一种带有主张的联盟形成模型。它假设代理人对他们可以通过组建联盟产生的产出拥有主张。产出不足以满足要求，并由规则进行配给，该规则的划分建议促使每个代理人对她可以参与的联盟进行排名。结果，出现了一种组建联盟的享乐游戏。利用资源的单调性和一致性，我们描述了连续配给规则，这些规则引发了承认核心稳定性的享乐游戏。
This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs, insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions in which she can participate. As a result, a hedonic game of coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce hedonic games that admit core-stability.